The Oracle Chapter 4 (Anthropos)
Lorient Montaner
Free Will
(Eleytheri Boylisi)
1. The Oracle defines free will, as a concept of this philosophy that is the notional capacity or ability to choose accordingly, between different possible courses of action unimpeded and uninterrupted.
2. It is intended for the purpose of self-expression and self-reliance. It does not equate with the notion of destiny or the divinity of a god per se. It merely encompasses all that is rational and volitional. Epictetus said, "We cannot choose our external circumstances, but we can always choose how we respond to them".
3. Socrates had believed that free will and self-control are one and the same, combined in commitment, the concept that reason, properly cultivated, can and ought to be the all-controlling factor in human life.
4. According to Aristotle, free will and moral responsibility are determined by our endowed character. This would be exemplified afterwards, by our ability to be rational and conscious.
5. I believe that the compulsive nature of human behaviour is related to the certain degrees of emotional instability and irrational thinking that results unnaturally. Freedom of expression is the way to liberty and free will. Epictetus believed that no man is free who is not master of himself.
6. Free will is conditioned to a sequence of order or actions that are at best, probable or contingent. We could appear to have the determination that constitutes as our will, but it cannot be equally measured and considered libertarian in the philosophical sense, when it is predicated on the principles of variables, particulars, universals and constants. Ergo, it needs to be verified through volent actions.
7. Thus, the notion of a free will is determined by an action that is proven correlatively to the exponible action and manifestation of an expressible want. In the end, whether free will, determinism and compatibilism are compossible is a matter more of endeitic states of probability.
8. We must always use the criterion of relativity to make any logical arguments plausible, in the commonality of universal sense. If not, they will result in illogical deductions that would make them irrelevant.
9. The most common form of deception displayed is the most apparent form of dishonesty conceived historically, in dogmatic platitudes and undesirable extremes that are nothing more than futility.
10. There is the perception that destiny is a material course that could easily be altered by us, but that would not be entirely conclusive. We could presume that there is an actual destiny that is finite in the nature of its composition, and it is not improbable to assume that we are participants of some form of a deterministic universe. Even so, it does not preclude that we are without free will.
11. Human stupidity is not the same thing as human ignorance. Stupidity in humans is the presumption of knowledge, and ignorance is the lack of knowledge. Within that cogitation there is the apparent truth of the misleading perception of the human will.
12. To acknowledge that fate is fundamentally predetermined or determined and it negates thus, any notion of free will is most likely bold in the assumption, but it would imply that my choice would be predicated on a contingency or action predetermined, disenabling my free will.
13. It does not mean that some kind of divine agent controls our destiny, without our volitional involvement or accessory interaction. If we inferred from that belief of determinism, then it would mean that the actions of human beings are deterministic, even though it would appear that they are consciously sufficient and adaptable to decide for themselves rationally.
14. From that supposed deduction, our power and resolution would be considered fruitless and inconsequential, because these attributes are linked to contingent factors. Nevertheless, there are probabilities that could be more aligned to the causal effects of some instance of a manifestation of free will.
15. I think that all people have the ability for original thoughts and ideas within their minds. What people do with their thoughts and ideas after the realisation of their capacity determines the manner in which people make decisions and establish their ideology. The problem is not the mere essence of any thoughts and ideas, but the meaning of those thoughts and ideas that establish that ideology.
16. When I am addressing the subject of choice, I am explicating the misconception about its usage. In order to express choice as a selection, we must first understand the distinction and accentuation of its actual meaning and significance.
17. I could believe in my asserted assumption that I have a definite choice in my selection, but let me explain the selective process of that possibility. First, there must be a contingency for a need, then a specific reason for that selection.
18. If I infer that I do not have a free will to choose my selection, then I would be reducing my option or alternative to a lesser choice, not with the faculty of rational thinking. There is a simplicity in this argument of mine, the mind must be in unison with the will.
19. Once more to fully understand the universal meaning of choice, people must understand the natural process. Choice without the contingent factors of need and reason is absent of purpose, and purpose without choice is absent of logic.
20. The essence of the heimarmene or so-called fate in philosophy is not intended to be understood, as a forcible imposition of time or a divine agent to the notion of any plausible libertarian will or eleuthery, instead in my opinion the heimarmene is to be acknowledged, as the realisation of our actions that are independent to the notion of a divine fate that is existential in truth and nature.
21. Fate and luck in the analogy outside of the philosophical sense are basically irrelevant, because time is interminable and luck is nothing more than the perception of something.
22. Man could advocate any principle of philosophy and its cause and justification for his desire, but without the throne of absolute power, that man is only a visionary aspirer with no will to proceed in his aspiration.
23. It is necessary to explicate that free will is a choice to exercise, not a power to be exploited. The pretermission of that germaneness would suggest that power is solely the driving force behind free will. One must not confuse power with determination and volition to succeed.
24. Without free will, we would be subjugated to a blind fate or destiny of which we know not, or of which we could control in its entirety. This would imply that we are only participants of life, not owners of our thoughts and rationality.
25. The Oracle advocates free will, within a cause and effect. It is significant that we comprehend that if we are not allowed to be free thinkers and able to think for ourselves in our selections and decisions, then we are marginalised and we become banausic and irrelevant as a species. God or gods do not determine our lives, or should he or they.
26. Our mortality is not a question of death solely, it is defined by our life, and how we live that life in accordance to our decisions and actions. We could alter its existence, or it be can altered by circumstances. Free will allows us to live and think.
27. When we address the issue of free will, we are also addressing the issue of free thinking. Both of these elements are intrinsically linked with each other in their viability. It is not a question of solipism or egoism, when we adhere to the concept of pronoia. What is meant by pronoia is foresight, not divine providence.
28. We learn by rote or ordalium, things of which we process in our thoughts and offer in our opinions revealed. By inhibiting this natural process, we are then inhibiting our minds and expression.
29. This would only impede our deliberation and progression. It would make us put more emphasis on our flaws than the inclusion of our animus and nous. A sophos that is pansophic is a man that does not require divine immanence. The philosophical immanence that he could ascertain would be internal to his ipseity and rewarding to his gnosis.
30. He does not need to be a god to obtain the sagacity that his mind provides for himself. He could err in his path, but he ultimately reaches his destination, when he is able to use that sagacity freely.
31. We could contend the issue of free will, with the inclusion of a god or the exclusion of a god, but what must be elaborated is that the philosophy elicited and expressed in the Oracle speaks of human will, not some preternatural will of a deity imposed.
32. It must be mentioned that all things determined or not have a concatenation with contingency. Whether we dismiss that eventuality is irrelevant to the issue. Whatever action or decision that is exerted is based on the contingent factor of something already established.
33. What would life be if we were a hostage to fate? If life was already determined and we could not alter the course of its destiny, then what good or purpose would it serve to function in a world that was predetermined from its origin?
34. We as humans have the inherent will to change the course of our lives. We can define ourselves and strive against the notion of our alterity. We could be philodoxical or choose to be lucid with our minds, and intuitively reason with contemplation, about the things that we attempt to comprehend more effectively.
35. Our will, will progress in life, when we learn to utilise it and when we enable our foundation to proceed in its actions. It is not a will of imposition, but a will that provides us the foundation for our rational coherency.
36. If we do not possess ratiocination lucidly, then our mind is nullified and restricted to the instability of our emotions and repetitive instinct that are not reliable nor productive.
37. Free will is not a reward that we gain, but a right that we have earned. Nothing is guaranteed with free will, yet everything that we do with it, gives us the ability to learn and be sagacious, when we are permitted to express our minds.
38. To relinquish one's will to determinism is to relinquish one's self. It would render that identity feckless and irrelevant. It is veracious that the universe does not depend on us for its existence, but one must be conscious of the fact that we are a part of the universe. Things that occur in the universe naturally, or through a phenomenon do not occur, through thought or the action of a mind.
39. We govern our minds when rational, as we forsake them when irrational. Knowing that we have activated minds and can use them wisely, we must always seek to express our thoughts. Free will is not a dormant nullibiety.
40. If a god determines our fate, then what is the point in living a life that is predestined from its origin? If we are born in a society that is predestined for us or a life that is predestined for us by others, then what logic would life signify, if it was not allowed to evolve freely? When things of this nature occur, then it is the oppression of free will, not the concept of free will that should be debated.
41. Thus, it is reason that enables us to reflect on what is the difference between a choice and a necessity? What is the difference between self-identity or compatibility? What is the difference between determination or complacency?
42. It is facile to be complacent in this world, then to be determined. Free will does not replace complacency with determination, it merely activates our consciousness and rumination.
43. It could appear in the model of the universe that all is determined through the cause of reality, but when we speak of human beings and determinism, we cannot exclude the notion of free will. What I describe as free will is comparative to the human mind, not the universe.
44. It must be explained that what is determined is not the same as what is contingent. For example, a person could express through his agency free will, despite the fact that it seems that there are things that the person cannot control. That is more determined, but there are things that we control that are contingent on our actions and decisions.
45. When we observe the things that are perceived in our minds, we are able to conceive thoughts, and this is the mechanism of free will. When we are reluctant to achieve our goals, it is because we are determined that we have no true course of action that is not dependent on others. Our faculty of free will is predisposed to our actions and decisions.
46. The difference between voluntary will and involuntary will is believing and thinking that we can either change the course of something or that it is impossible to change it intentionally.
47. With free will, we must accept that things are not the consequence of a determination, but by contingency. With free will, there comes responsibility. Each human being is responsible for their actions and decisions. We cannot simply eschew that responsibility with our obstinacy.
48. When we exercise free will voltionally, we are consciously aware about the things that are important and not important. We learn to value the things that are necessary from unnecessary.
49. The faculty of judgement validates our free well. It permits us to focus on the things that are relevant to us and the things we can control. It is important that we denote that reality.
50. Free will does not empower at all our status alone, it only grants us the emergent power of changing our status in life from achieving a goal or to remaining in the same status quo.
51. It can be an axiopisty that we depend on, or a prolepsis that provides us with an instrumentality that as human beings, we can process and determine its validity. Free will is not the answer to selfhood, or the entropy of determinism, instead it is the utility of the mind.
52. "Men are swayed more by fear than by reverence," said Aristotle. It is known that things that we cannot explain, we fear. It is easier to present falsifiability than to acknowledge comprehensibility. It is easier to represent uncertainty than to demonstrate confidence. Those that are confident are those that strive further, and those that fear are those that remain irrelevant.
53. "How can you call a man free when his pleasures rule over him?" Socrates declared. There are persons that are hedonists or Epicureans. For them life is all about the pursuit of pleasure, and for them free will is not a question of choice, but preference.
54. Perhaps, we shall never be in concurrence with the question is free will a plausibility or an implausibility. Philosophy is a unique teaching that imparts free thinking and consciousness.
55. To assume that as human beings, we are incapable of choice is to assume we are without reasoning. To assume that we are destined in life is to assume that we have no course but that of which is provided for us, and only that course as our option.
56. Free will does not make us wiser than others, it merely makes us conscious. Whether we decide to make that sudden realisation depends on our intuitive sense of understanding, how life evolves and how we evolve.
57. We can choose to be represented by our free will or determine that it is only destiny that determines our life, not our will. This would imply that we live for our destiny than to create one that is not conditioned to our limitations.
58. Once more the factor of contingency is what conduces our lives and actions. However, we are still capable of some form of free expression and changing the course of our lives willingly.
59. If we submitted our will to the notion of a planned destiny that deprived us of the natural process of thought, logic and rationality, then we would be forced to accept our lives as meaningless.
60. Nothing in life is supposed to be easily understood and surmised as a definite thing, except life and death. Everything else is a contingent thing that has a sequential order that explains its evolution. There are innumerable things that are variable or invariable in essence, but these things are mostly matter, not the intricacy of the mind that are thoughts.
61. It is the mind and its inveteracy that persists in its plight for the insoluble enigmas, about the question of free will and other philosophic relevancies. The mind is a powerful mechanism, and so is our will.
62. To dismiss the capacity of the mind is to dismiss the capacity of thought and reason. What makes volition differ from nolition is the effects of determination. Determination will allow a person to broaden their internal conviction and integral knowledge.
63. To aspire to something is much more convincing and tangible in essence, when there is great inspiration and free will to enable the mind to effectuate that aspiration afterwards.
64. When that aspiration transforms into a goal or purpose, then it is free will that composes our ideas and thoughts and forms them into coherent objectives. These objectives, then transform into our deeds or actions.
65. The assertion of fate should not circumscribe our conception and expressive manner of free will. On the contrary, it should edify our reason for free will a fortiori.
66. By strengthening the mind, we are imbued with the phronesis that dictates our capability to learn about things that are exponible and lucid in our world. A strong mind will convince a strong will.
67. There are distinctive things that are within their concepts noumenal and conglomerative. Free will is one of those things that aligned with conviction, rationality and logic provide us, with the firm basis of a transpicuous vision.
68. What we perceive from that vision is what we ultimately conceive, as relevant and substantial. A person nullified of free will is not only a person oppressed, but a person unable to express themselves either willingly or unwillingly.
69. When we experiment quondam experiences, we are relating to the rapid sequence of time and events. Thus, we are applying knowledge and thought to those things that we have learnt and acquired.
70. It must be stated that as human beings, we are constantly evolving in our mind and learning new things that form the omphalos of our knowledge and wisdom, which we apply daily.
71. To be practical is not erroneous. It is when our practicality supersedes our free thinking and makes our judgement erroneous. To be logical means one is simply conscious in their mind.
72. Our ability to rationalise, and the application of thought affects our idiosyncrasy and our mental faculties. With rationality our free will is not inhibited, but without it, we can only attempt to rationalise that which we seek to rationalise. In other words what our will wishes is limited to only the means of that expression. It cannot solve the enigma of what importance does that will represent.
73. Free will can represent many things that a person believes is expressive and volitional. It is the noesis that enables our free will in the first place to be measured, with a tremendous value that we equate to individuality.
74. There is a truth in the usage of free will. It is one that we seek and attempt to understand. The will is as strong as the mind is. If we do not learn this lesson from the beginning, then what purpose will this lesson serve?
75. To exercise free will is not about displaying one's self-indulgence or ego. It is about the presence or renewal of the self. The one thing that defines who we are and who we want to be identified.
76. "Freedom is the greatest fruit of self-sufficiency," said Epicurus. This, we can apply to the notion of free will. If we cannot satisfy ourselves, then how do we expect others to do so, without expecting something in return.
77. Once we have accepted things of which we cannot control, then we rationalise those things that which we can. As Epicurus stated, some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency.
78. To what point can we humans be autonomous with our free will? To the point when we can control the things as moral agents. As an agent, we are capable of distinguishing the things that are of necessity, from the things that occur by contingency. It is difficult to conceive that things transpire by mere chance or serendipity only. They either are the cause of some contingent phenomenon or they are simply the cause of our actions and decisions.
79. We could argue for a determined fate and posit that a god or universal elements dictate the course of our life since our birth, or argue that life can be altered with our free will. It is veracious that death seems to be a predestined eventuality, but it does not preclude or conclude, when it will take place. Ipso facto, it is better to assume that our free will is best used with things that we can control.
80. When we discuss free will, the concepts of libertarianism, determinism, compatibilism and incompatibilism are introduced into the main discussion. There is not a singular vision of what free will represents in its totality, or is there absolute views of its negation in its plurality, to include or exclude the possibility of free will.
81. We could postulate that free will is non-existent and dispute that plausibility, but that would imply that free will has no zeroth potentiality of thought. Thus, eliminating the mechanism to our thought process, which is aligned to our mind.
82. Free will is not an invariable system that provides us with all the answers, it is a coherent expression of our volition. To presume that it is, is to paralogise in its conclusion.
83. As human beings, we possess ethosed qualities that make us sentient, percipient and sapient. Scilicet, it is these qualities that permit us the enhancement of our consciousness. In return, it enables us to understand things that are fundamental to us about life in the broader sense.
84. When we experience acrasia, we are experimenting an onus that inhibits our noesis and our empirical knowledge. Eventually, it will reflect in our sophrosyne. In the dynamics of our free will a sound mind is always required, in order to think rationally and attain aponia.
85. Without an excogitation, our references to free will become more dilogical and less deictic. Our stable disposition is vital to our free will and eleutherian pursuit. It exposes our rationality or irrationality with our comportment.
86. To be endowed with free will is to be empowered, with an autexousious human nature, not a homousious nature. When we comprehend the limitation of our mortality and its capacity, then things of relevance become much more sententious in their purpose.
87. The implex nature of free will perhaps never be deciphered, and we shall continue to intimate with concepts or arguments, for or against free will. There are some people that state that free will is a sign of irrationality, while others that is it the expression of rationality. That in itself is not an alogism.
88. Whether or not free will is arbitrary or unarbitrary, depends on our point of view and perception of free will. We could reject the premise of free will or embrace its established foundation. Either one will not denote the comprehension of free will to be schematic.
89. The viability of free will compared to the notion of a predestined fate is much more intricate than its presupposition. Fate is more conducive to faith than to logic and reason. Fate is an incompossibility to the mind actuated. Faith is something that conditions our free will. It inhibits our thoughts and our ability to have intellectual disagreements with dogmas.
90. Once more to assume that everything in our life is predestined or destined is to admit to an incongruency and the invariable state of human actions or decisions. We cannot be a captive to the thought that we are incapable of evolving as human beings.
91. I do not make the assertion that free will is the only recourse of self-expression. I simply make the claim that without it, we are devoid of a significant part of the nucleus of our selfhood.
92. The Oracle does not presume to be the authority of one's mind nor of one's ethos. It cannot project beyond the scope of one's intentions nor necessities. Its sole purpose is the attainment of enlightenment.
93. Our deportment is incumbent on our decisions and actions, but free will does not encroach on our decisions or actions with necessity. Instead, it is a vehicle of our mind to express openly and volitiently, our thoughts and desires in compatibility with reason.
94. Things that are innominate or undefined should not be presumed to be a patent representative of a predetermined fate, a zemblanity or epochality. We should not indulge our mind with such senseless thoughts.
95. Free will is composed of the intrinsic elements of thoughts and reason. It can be propounded as the precursor to ratiocination. What it is not in its totality is the finality to reason.
96. In philosophy, we are taught that nothing is a certainty prescribed, until we have explored the uncertainties. Nothing remains invariable, until we have fully discovered the variables.
97. Free will to some is possible and to others it is impossible. It can be explained in many ways and understood in concepts and ideas, but its origin is profoundly embedded in the psyche of a human being.
98. To acknowledge that we possess free will is to assume that we are rightful owners of our own lives. It does not make us superior than others or does it makes us wiser. It simply makes us more conscious.
99. It is the conscious realm that guides us in our lives. Without consciousness, free will is inoperable, and its utility would be then considered futile. Plato declared that we are only exercising free will by consciously choosing to be good over naturally succumbing to evil.
100. This is the reason, why is it necessary to achieve a comprehensibility about free will that will adhibit us to seek the fruition of our lives. Without life, there is no free will to enact its purport. The ultimate goal of life should be to live a virtuous and fulfilling life, and that free will should be used to achieve this goal. Our will is a part of our life.
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