The Oracle Chapter 4 (Cosmos)
God or gods
(Theos i theoi)
1. The Oracle defines a god or gods, as the primordial beings or entities that dwell in the supernatural realm of immortality.
2. Is a god to be conveyed tenably, as a concept or substance? If he is substance, then how are we to measure his quintessence in the universal sense, when his divinity is particular and outside of the realm of reality? Faith is not reliable evidence. To not acknowledge that is an omission of the truth.
3. If so, then what is the distinction between the two comparative notions that define him that are not unreasonably conceived and are beyond the argument of a propugned probability? It is possible that the belief in a god is only, a fundamental demonstration of human gullibility or yearning for a supernatural entity than the materialisation of our universal reality that we know exists.
4. I could define the god of theism, deism, pandeism, pantheism, panentheism, monotheism or omnitheism, but I could not rationalise their conception, as being relevant to a physical universe that requires, no metacosmic god for its actual existence. It is facile to believe that if there is light, it is because of a god. If there are stars, it is because of a god. If there is a sun or a moon, a day or a night, it is because of a god. If these things are presumed evidence of his acts of creation, then what evidence do we have of his creation? These aforementioned things are all universal in their composition. Are we to believe that the essence of a god was composed from the same universal matter that is his creation? If so, it would make him incontrovertibly variable and dependent on his creation.
5. How could we imagine our existential nature as a part of the process of universal creation, without the substantiality of matter? We would have to believe that we are either a product of a masterful genius or the delusion of a madman. I can choose to belief in acosmism or accept the fact that the universe is likely self-regulating in its design. If we adhere to the notion of acosmism, then how would a god be defined as omnitude?
6. If one claims he is ultimate and that the aggregate of finitudes have faded in their relativity, then would an ultimate being not require by nature and logic, a viable origin that was of tangible substance as an inference? If we claim that his origin was of a supernatural phenomenon, it would still require an origin. To talk about a god as being ultimate, does not entail that he is ultimate, in a mereological appositeness that displays a necessity for a god, or the universe to be ultimate in the end.
7. Any form of existence physical in its nature, is recognisable in its residual or initial stage of existence. If it is espoused as being nonphysical and ultimate, then at what state does it remain invariable or variable in its existing form? For example, a fossil is a residual trace of a prior existence. With a god, we have none that we can equate to an irreversible and indisputable origin. How can a god be of omnifariousness and omniparity at the same time?
8. If the universe is dependent on a god, then what independence does the universe have, if it must be restricted to the notion of a god who requires none? How is this god universal then? How does he escape the actuality of the contradiction of his essence as being invariable? We have been embedded with the redundancy of the dogma of religion that bounds us to the limits of the influential acquirement to our total maturation as an individual entity.
9. Thus, it negates the very nature of our essence that appertains to the protension of the mind, the consciousness of the self and the enlightenment of our knowledge and wisdom. The indication of a juxtaposition of the concept of a divine designer with the universe is based on unfounded dixits and maxims of parologisms that are errantly used, by philopolemic persons of battology that assert the absolute truth about the origin and chronology of the universe.
10. To better comprehend and defend the argument of fine-tuning, an individual must comprehend fundamental knowledge, about the dimensional constants of nature, the differentiation between accidents or particulars, its relation to the structure of human evolution, the nature of reality and how the universe functions, the principles of the universe, the gravitational fine structure, the conditions that allow human beings to co-exist with the constants in the universe, the hierarchy of the cosmos, the developing elements of the universe, the variation of the observable universe, the metaphysical conclusions, the correlation of dark matter to regular matter and knowledge of cosmology.
11. In the end, that person would have to correlate the process of fine-tuning with the essential requirement of necessity, multiplicity, and purpose. This is all required without a god. A logical claim cannot equate an immaterial entity to a material universe, with a coherentific cosmological argument that bases an existence within and without a universe. That would be simply an obvious contradiction. If a god did have a manifest cause, there would still necessarily be a cause, which started everything or the hypothesis that was the correlation to the impossibility of the infinity.
12. To posit that a god was a necessary being, unlike the contingent universe, you would have to first postulate that his nonexistence is logically implausible. We know that for example, a square circle is logically implausible. To understand the concepts of causality and time, we would have to know how this being would relate to a reality that transcends our material world. We would have to ask the questions that would have to be answered such as, does this god exists by his own nature and evolution? What would that particular nature and evolution consist of in their entirety? If those elements of composition were infinite, then if the universe was created out of nothing, would it not imply its fixed point in time, as its reference and the circumference of space as being essentially infinite? Would this be the example of a sequence of cause and effect? If we consented to that postulation, then this god has no cause. His existence is a brute fact, and he is existential. Thus, he is proposed as the "ens realissimum", the most real being. How is a necessary being then, without any nature, evolution, space, materiality and cause and effect considered, a necessary being to the cosmos?
13. Therefore, the premise argued of causality would be either determined by inductive or deductive reasoning that was defined, as a manifest cause that had a tangible inference that could explicate his inherence.
14. The problem with that analogy is how do we deduce from an extrapolation of causality that is beyond our peirastic knowledge or any epagogic constatation?
15. The idea that an infinite causal regression offers a precise explanation is a paralogism. What would be the intrinsicality of an extrinsic being?
16. If the succession of causes resulted as being infinite, the entire link still would require a cause that relates to the cosmic nature and relevance.
17. To be intuitively cognisant is to be conscious of the certain relativity that is inferred, beyond a transcendental perception that is the induement of an apotheosis considered. How is it feasible to make the ultimate value of existence linked to faith, when faith is based on religious apprehension rather than concrete evidence? If we selected faith as the instrumentality of existence, then our material world would be conclusively irrelevant.
18. By using critical thinking and evidence such as rationalism and empiricism over the acceptance of any dogma, we enhance our knowledge and at the same time, our world perception and purview. We do not need the prerequisite of a god to understand the complexity of the world, but the need for an engaging consciousness to discover the existential things about the surrounding cosmos. Epicurus said, "It is futile to pray to the gods for that which one has the power to obtain by himself".
19. If the argument for a creator of the universe is that all creation has a creator, then we must distinguish the difference, between the concept of creation that is not dilogical or based on theocentrism and theopantism.
20. There are things of matter in the universe that are a conglomeration of physical components that have merged into tangible substances and are considered erroneously to be creation, when they are transformations or at best, the mergence of matter.
21. We know that energy became matter and liquid substance can become solid. These things are substantiated by our knowledge acquired.
22. Any part of matter is the product of a singular atom that has evolved into its material form that is clearly observable or defined.
23. Are we to call this process creation or the evolution of a natural process that began long before the notion of a creator was established?
24. It is important to denote that revelation. Not everything is a creation or needs a creator to be existential, in its counterpoise nature. The prescribed thought that creationism in itself is sufficient to explain the complexity of the universe and our world is congruent to the universe would be definitely antithetical to the basic fundamentals of the established laws of the universe.
25. The concept that nothing comes from nothing does not apply to something that has already existed in its duration and finality. Nothing can be precluded by the concept of an afterworld, when the fact is that there is a pre-existence established beforehand.
26. Creation in itself, does not conclude with the necessity of a creator, when that creation is already a product of something formed. We may believe that something observable has been created, but in essence, it is only a defined corollary.
27. To assume the prime mover or first cause of the universe and the Supreme Good as the final cause of all things, as a god in absolute that is the reason for the existence of the universe is a fallacy of religion.
28. To believe that a god is the first cause, the universe would first require a cause that could define its purpose as being universal, particular, not merely hypothetical. It is possible that the universe that we know, never had a first cause to begin with, in its inception that denotes a semblance of divinity.
29. If the basic principle of universal causation establishes that all things have known causes, although not necessarily deterministic causes, then are these causes more probabilistic in nature than necessary? Does a necessary cause require determinism or is a necessary cause only a contingency of a cause that needs the establishment of an irrefutable function to exist?
30. Aristotle never acknowledged the prime mover, as the god that is commonly known. The Cosmological Argument was posited as a "first cause", by Plato in the book "The Laws", and then in "Timaeus". He had presupposed an emergent "demiurge" that represented a higher sagacity and intelligence as the Creator, because motion required a self-originated mover. Aristotle had disputed the notion of a "first cause", that was erroneously linked to the concept of a "prime mover", in his physics and metaphysics. He believed that there were numerous "prime movers" or "unmoved movers" that powered the supernal sphere that were aligned to eternal motion in the cosmos. This Aristotle called "first philosophy", or metaphysics.
31. His prime movers were relative to the orbit of the Earth and the uniformity of its circular motion. These prime movers are responsible, for the process of the motions of the planets, etc. He did not suggest a particular creator. He was against the atomist's assertion of a non-sempiternal universe that would require a "first cause". He believed in an infinite cosmos, with no beginning or end. This is associated to the real meaning of Parmenides' declaration "nothing comes from nothing".
32. As for the Supreme Good, it would have to indicate that a divine god would have to have a superior and active consciousness that surpassed any notion of a mere influence and possessed, some form of extraordinary omnisentience and omnipercipience.
33. In the end if the universe had a first cause, then its cause would have to logically be in order, with the determined laws of the cosmos. If a god had an active consciousness and was all good, then he would have to be aware of the misery, suffering and evil that occur in the world. If a god has a mind, how would that mind be universal and binary, within the realm of reality and physicality? How could this mind function and be assumed to be eternal, when we don't know the components of its original composition? Are we to believe it's a flowing energy existing like a bodiless entity? If so, then how could it survive for eternity and that energy maintain itself continuously?
34. A god may be considered eternal and ultimate, but how can something presumed indivisible and ubiquitous be proven to be universal, if his proclaimed divinity excludes him from our observation and examination within reality? He would have to exist in an involute matrix of a paradoxical surreality.
35. To base an inference of existence predicated on the principle of a god would simply be negating the understanding of our present reality and abate in the argument proof by contradiction conflated. If a god was ultimate, then he would have an origin of which would prove his irrefutable longevity.
36. If our universe is one amongst an ample ensemble of universes in which constants varied randomly, then would not these universes require the adequate conglomeration of constants for the occurrence and necessity of life that surpasses the concept of a creator? If an infinite god was the originator of the universe, then why would he constrain his power to a finitude that would contradict his state of infinity?
37. Why would such an omnipotent and perfect deity require any form of human worship to function, from imperfect beings that presumably would have a limited comprehension of his presupposed essence and existence?
38. Why would a god distinguish us from other members of creation, not allow other species to worship and understand him in the collective sense of omniscience? As people, we should aspire to the principles of humanism and philanthropy, for the ultimate preservation of our planet and species, not to the belief of an invisible, sanctimonious force that could never materialise, beyond the act of faith.
39. If there was or is a divine agent that created the actual universe, the necessary question would be asked, what or who created this supreme agent in his composition or entirety?
40. Is this being the god of deism or theism, pantheism or panentheism? If the evolution of the cosmos is accredited to this one, universal being, as the absolute ruler and creator of plenipotence due to infinite regression, then where and when did this god originate from?
41. What transparent substance did he derive from? What was he before in his quondam quiddity? If he is presently outside of time, space and matter, then what noumenon could be ascribed to his cosmic nature and relativity that could be ascertained, with knowledge and evidence that were definite and incontrovertible?
42. The best supposition or evidence offered would result in a contradictory and nomothetic inverity, with only a monothetic principle adduced or deduced. This analogy would imply that a god could not be or was ultimately universal, physical or finite.
43. If he is or was assumed multiversal, nonphysical or infinite, then how could he be anything more than a phenomenon of preternatural significance that is predicated on a false absolutism that does not reject his constant state of perfection and perceptible flaws?
44. Is it not vain to suggest that perfection is only exclusive of him and that everything else in the universe is a composite of his flawed creation and is imperfect? Thus, we are to adhere to the thought that we are imperfect beings and a god is the sign of a supernal perfection that is unmatched and singular.
45. Would this not be the accurate description of a haughty, callous and flawless being that imposes and requires worship of supposed inferior beings to satisfy his utmost ego and authority than the modest, loving and perfect god of religion preached so insistently?
46. The advent of religion and the vanguard of science have imposed mainly, the constitution of our teaching and learning, but philosophy has given us the vehicle of enlightenment. Religion professes the concept of a barmecidal heaven and hell of which, this philosophy describes as a surreal abstraction that can be defined, as apocryphal in description, and science offers the theories of the laws of physics that dismiss the materiality of a heaven or hell.
47. How could anyone be assumed to be more than a mortal being in essence, when the only truth to consider is our mortality is the ephemerality of our natural existence to date?
48. For countless centuries mankind has waited for the end of the world, yet few can even agree, when the world began and continged its ultimate state. A logical claim cannot equate an immaterial entity to a material universe scientifically or philosophically, with a coherentific cosmological argument that bases an existence within and without a universe. That would be simply an obvious contradiction.
49. Essentially, we are existential beings that reside, in the continuum of the space of consciousness and subconsciousness with causality, without a god. “Men create gods after their own image, not only with regard to their form but with regard to their mode of life.”- said Aristotle.
50. The Oracle proclaims no divinity, or is aligned to a divine agent operating immanently, within the imperceptible realm of transcendency. Why does it appear more difficult to accept the logical argument that there is nothing beyond this world, except the yearning for a paradise we cannot even behold or rationalise consequently as existential?
51. Am I to follow the puritanic laws of religion, over the sententious teachings of philosophy that are not derived, from an unlawful imposition? To acknowledge that fate is fundamentally predetermined by a god would negate any notion of our free will. Any action determined by us would be considered fruitless and inconsequential. Fate is not a forcible imposition of time or the divine restraint of any plausible libertarian will or eleuthery. It is an abstraction we define.
52. Any intricate theory or concept can be refuted with facts, but the discordance is not in the proposition of its truism, instead, in the value of its argument. The concept of a god differs from one religion or credence to another, but without irrefutable evidence, any concept of a god would be deduced as ignosticism.
53. Why do we assume that we are the centre of the universe, when we are, not even a small fraction of its fundamental totality? A belief is not the same as faith, because faith is mere devotion inspired and belief is a conscious thought, embedded in our mind. Is the world so difficult to understand for us or is the understanding of the world more complex?
54. A person cannot presume to know with indisputable evidence about an abditive god, if the mind is not allowed to discover the essence and nature of that supposed god in his existence, without the Rhadamanthine dogmas of religion that impose their self-righteousness and theomony.
55. The cosmological transparency is discovered in the meticulous and conscientious study and examination of the universe, through the observations of cosmology and cosmogony.
56. Is its existence necessary? Is that cause attached to a transumptive or transcendental form of monism, pantheism, emanationism, creationism, essentialism or humanism?
57. What are the ultimate material components of the universe that are composite with an invariable god? Are these components viable, through either a mechanism, dynamism, hylomorphism, or atomism that is manifest? What is the ultimate reason for the existence of the universe? Is it finite or infinite in its transcendence?
58. Does the cosmos have a purpose that exceeds any vague teleological notion? Does the existence of active consciousness have a purpose in the universe?
59. How do we know what we know about the complex entirety of the cosmos is precise? Does cosmological ratiocination reveal metaphysical truths that exceed inferred epistemological or ontological claims that are only polysemantic and equivocal?
60. Before the expansion of the universe, the universe was believed to be a minute singularity that existed in a form that was smaller than a subatomic particle. This would mean that what proceeded the universe was entirely divineless.
61. The question is, if the natural reference of our observation is from things established and transparent to us, to things that are transparent and established by nature, then the cognoscible things to us are not identical, as those things known with a contingency?
62. How could any first principle be considered valid, when the observation is based not on the criterion of that first principle, instead, on the falsehood of an observation that does not establish the relevancy of that first principle?
63. What makes two human beings different is not their substantial form that remains the same, or their accidental form that can differ, but their matter. Matter not form is what defines us in being. If a god is matterless, then how can we assume that he has any form of existence that functions within the realm of universality?
64. We are not the omphalos of the universe and we are not a singularity of an immaculate conception, but the plurality of a universal composition and congeries. We are not born with the absoluteness of purity. People can believe that we are born with human innocence, but they are not, because it would imply that they can distinguish right from wrong from their birth. As Socrates said, "The unexamined life is not worth living".
65. It is presumed that our observations and perceptions are based on the empirical and metempirical conceptions that are reflected, in the quondam experiences of living beings and quoddamodotative properties of the universe.
66. If I am to reason that there is a god, I must first reason, what universal substance would that god be composed of that would not only differ than a pagan god, but be part of the matrix that is our actual universe?
67. People once believed that the lightning and thunder of storms were conjoined phenomena that were produced by a god, when they have been proven to be logically and scientifically explicated.
68. If there was a supreme being that ruled the universe and was the sole proprietor of our destiny, then how could any living human being or act be considered immoral or sinful in accordance to religion, when that person that commits the act of sin has no absolute control or authority of that act from the beginning, because those sins would be considered a whole of a given destiny that was already predetermined by that supreme being?
69. If this creator was pure energy, then that distinctive energy would manifest and govern the universe. That would mean that that creator also would have to submit to its universal laws of subsistence and be governed by these laws at one point. This type of energy would have to be defined and measured.
70. If we inferred that this creator was solely immaterial and outside the universe, then how could this divine energy be maintained and why should anyone reasonable consider that deity to be universal? Therefore, how could this creator govern the universe from some unknown throne invisibly in synchronicity? If he is an eternal mass of energy that can be construed as an epiphany of light, air and force, amongst other unearthly attributes, then how could he be assumed to be invariable, if he would have to function in a dualistic realm that is our reality?
71. Essentially, our energy is contingent to an interchangeable form of universal energy, and it does not need to constitute the intelligible design of a creator for its conclusion. If a god was an immaterial force of energy and immutable in his state of existence, then that would imply that he could not function beyond his limitation, or be the prime force to the universe. He would need to be variable, not invariable, even as a creator.
72. Anyone can believe that the force of energy is eternal, omnipresent and powerful, but it would not be the undeniable quintessence of an indivisible deity that creates or destroys at will. If he was or is the definite state of consciousness and optimal perfection eventually, then he would have to possess a mind that was capable of being interchangeable.
73. People could easily attach a perennial nature and attributes to a god, within their metaphysical claims, but how could a god be considered immaterial and material, impassable and passable, mutable and immutable, within the composite forms of cosmological matter?
74. If a god became man somehow in a physical manner, then how could he be compatible with his creation in the analytical notion and be composed of two natures divided at the same time ceteris paribus?
75. How could a man be the image of an invisible god and how do we describe this metaphenomenal resurrection, if this god is defined as invisible and asomatous in nature? Why would a god crucify himself and submit himself to man and be considered, as still omnipotent and perfect? Why do people adhere to the notion of an unfounded physitheism?
76. A building could seem to require a builder and a painting a painter. This statement would conclude as being a logical inference, but if I examine the building and the painting, I could deduce that each object would need also other elements of matter to contribute in their natural composition.
77. That is to say, without the ground for the building and the canvas for the portrait, neither one of these visible constructions would be effectuated, because a builder and painter would too require a brain that is substance.
78. There is no such thing as absolute perfection, except the thought that a divine designer could be considered perfect. In the religious sense, the reality of perfection is the truth of the concept professed as that maximious divinity. Human beings will never attain ultimate superiority, because we are inferior beings by nature and creation. If we ascribed to a creator, it would denote his imperfection.
79. In the philosophical sense, this interpretation would be construed as erroneous, because if human nature is flawed, then would not the reality of a divine designer have to be flawed as well ultimately? Do we simply bow to a sublime demiurge, because he is the personification of a paragon of abstract perfection?
80. The only conceivable reality of this ancestral notion of a perfect agent is located in the firm belief of people, not in the cosmic relevance. This is where the divergence of opinion differs, in the concepts of Creatio ex nihilo or Creatio ex Materia.
81. If the cosmos operates without purpose and is only the known essence of gravity, nuclear forces and energy, then why do people continue to argue that it has a fundamental purpose, as if it had a necessary consciousness?
82. Human beings realised that there was purpose for their lives afterwards, because of consciousness, not the cosmos with its undivine laws of nature. It has no mind. The question that I pose, does a god have one? If a god has one and it is a disembodied mind then, that mind would have only the capacity to store knowledge such as facts, not determine their validity, without a congruity that had a foundation to install in that mind an inherent teaching, as its predecessor for the acquisition of knowledge. It would lack the ability to have rationality.
83. The assertion that human beings on the planet derived from some supernatural element that had exuperated materiality or nothing would be predicated, on the requirement of the absence of the clear surrounding existence and unreliable pisticity.
84. We would too have to accede to the fact that the accretion of the convergent elements of matter and form that composed human beings were magically conceived, from a sempiternal entity of a nonphysicality. The universe has existed, even before the first concept or worship of a god by humans was established, and it will continue to exist long after the notion of gods.
85. Gods are discernible as a matter of principle, not of physical transparency. I would ultimately conclude in the assertion of my scepticism that any certainty about anything is indubitably impossible, because no one can never know the actual existence of a god, without absolute apodicticity. Thus, a philosopher is left with either the concept of logical positivism that asserts that the only statements verifiable through direct observation or logical evidence are meaningful or philosophemes of metaphysical relevance.
86. The general sense that there are innumerable things that cannot be explicated, by the comprehensive nature of the mind does not insinuate that these things are existential or a feasibility. These things would have to be detected, if they were inanimate or animated.
87. A presumed perception could be a misleading observation, when we analyse the substance and result of that exact perception with meticulosity and constatation. Even the supposed image of a god can be perceived as real, but it does not prove his existence.
88. That is to say, if we examine something unusual like in the formation of the rocks, sand and clouds and perceive that formation to be something tangible in our observation, then that mere thing can transform into anything that we perceive.
89. The thing is that what may appear visually as the transparency of something relevant is in reality, nothing more than the irrelevant nature of a misconstrued perception that has no transcendental truth.
90. If a god is a necessary being attached to a necessary cause, then every being is contingent in nature, but the infinite link is not in its entirety. Now, where does the factor of time equate to that cause, and the point of reference in which all forms of dimensions originated with the beginning of space, time and matter?
91. Simply, without time, then what was prior to the existence of the universe? If a god is a timeless being, how could this god remain relevant and be the "first cause" to the universe, when the universe is material and an almighty god is not?
92. If a god does not require a form of materiality or a "first cause", then why should the universe require a cause that is compossible to an absolute divinity that has no universal cause? The argument would be construed, as a contradiction.
93. What we know presently is that our reality is a conscious and subconscious relation to the universal existence and its cosmology, as we perceive it. To presume a god in that reality would be to propound a dilogy that could only espouse to the notion of faith, as its attesting foundation. "Men ask for health in their prayers to the gods: they do not realize that the power to achieve it lies in themselves. Lacking self-control, they perform contrary actions and betray health to their desires," Democritus said.
94. There are some that propose that there is a metagnostic probability that everything that proceeds from our perception is merely reduced to an undefined observation and interpretation that we assume, as theopneustic in its dynamics. "If the world is the product of nothing but natural forces and natural law, divine intervention is impossible," said Lucretius.
95. I could gravitate to the material substance that stimulates my thoughts only or permit myself to accept the metaphysical observation of material substance that exists, with the physical universe and its transparent form of co-existence. Humanism allows us to think and do for ourselves than to rely on blind providence.
96. Is it necessary to believe that anything that is metaphysical is beyond our human perception or is that perception the only truth that we shall ever know, regardless of its material or immaterial nature and conception? What cannot be explained should not be called so easily preternatural by philosophers, or those that espouse the avatar of fideism. It should be given the name of undetermined. The universe is not a heaven or hell, for that, there is the Earth that humans create their own vision of that illusion or reality.
97. The actions of the universe are simply indifferent to human existence and any notional god would have to be conscious of this indifference. Even if we applied a metaphysical claim of a noumenal effect, the best that the argument would sustain, would be the possibility of a potentiality yet undiscovered.
98. It is practical to believe that existence is not conditioned to an impending force from an empyrean exocosm, but we must define the nature of existence; even that of a presupposed divine agent or theos of pleroma and exousia. "A god, if he truly is a god, stands in need of nothing", said Euripides.
99. Why do we think we are alone in the universe, when it is only the perception that we are alone? The world does not require salvation from a god, it should procure salvation from the tyranny of man. There is a certain truth to the notion of cosmicism. The universe does not require our existential being to survive. We create our mythopoeic world of beliefs in sui generis gods of prosopopoeia and theogony, but we forget that we are agathokakological. We have survived and evolved for centuries, long before the advent of a god. "Timendi causa est nescire."
100. It all began with the first pagan god that was worshipped. Ipso facto, for centuries, religion has imposed its doctrines of credulity on to mankind, as the supernal origin to the cosmos than a quod erat demonstrandum. As a neoteric society of free thinkers, we have outgrown the necessity and worship for a divine god, just as we have outgrown the illusion of a divine paradise, Olympus or Valhalla. We no longer worship Zeus or Odin in our homage. Nor are we mere sheepherders. Gods in the material sense, are not a realistic proposition, so assuming that they exist does not make them existential or cunctipotent. It merely makes them at best, conceptual. "Fere libenter homines id quod volunt credunt."
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